Egypt's Suez Canal was modernized, expanded and re-built by the French between 1859 and 1869, following a disused ancient canal built by Roman Emperor Trajan in the year 100 AD, is a 120 mile sea level commercial carrier route connecting the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean through the Mediterranean and Red Seas bypassing a dangerous 5000 mile transit around Africa and through the windswept and seasonal Southern Ocean.
The Canal's current economic decline caused by Houthi Islamist Terrorist/Pirates has been very large, although it varies by ship type and by whether one measures Red Sea port calls, Suez Canal transits or complete crossings into the Indian Ocean or beyond into the Pacific.
Although there has been some recovery since the US' Epic Fury military campaign against Houthi sponsor Iran started, container shipping was down about 90% in 2024 compared with pre-attack levels.
Overall Suez Canal traffic is down roughly two-thirds at the worst point.
Red Sea port calls are down about 85% - from more than 200 per month to fewer than 40 in the first half of 2024.
Dry-bulk carriers are down about 80% in June 2024 compared with June 2023. (U.S. Naval Institute)
The most recent broader estimate holds traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb strait at the southern end of the Red Sea was still about 31 ships per day, compared with roughly 75 per day before the crisis — a decline of about 59%. The attacks have therefore diverted a substantial share of shipping around Africa's Cape of Good Hope, adding time, fuel, insurance, and crew costs.
The attacks are attributed to the Iran-backed Houthi terrorist movement, which has used missiles, drones, and attempted boardings against commercial ships.
Many experts describe the activity as terrorism, rather than conventional piracy, because the perpetrators are a territorial political-military movement rather than ordinary private pirates driven by greed alone.
Egypt has not tried to solve the problem by directly attacking the Houthis. The main reasons are:
The threat is outside Egypt’s territory. The attacks originate in Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb, roughly 1,000 miles from the Suez Canal. Egypt can patrol the northern Red Sea, but it cannot easily suppress the missile and drone threat without operations against Houthi launch sites in Yemen.
Egypt lacks the capability and political mandate to do that alone. The United States and European partners have the long-range naval and air capabilities being used for convoy protection and strikes. Egypt’s navy is better suited to coastal defense and local maritime security than to a sustained expeditionary campaign.
Direct attacks could escalate the conflict. Cairo has tried to preserve working relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the Persian Gulf states. Striking the Houthis could invite retaliation against Egyptian shipping, ports, or the canal and could pull Egypt into the Yemen war.
Ships cannot be made safe merely by defending the canal’s northern end. A vessel that has to pass the Bab el-Mandeb under missile threat may avoid the entire route, even if the Suez Canal itself is secure.
Egypt is financially constrained. Suez revenues fell sharply as traffic diverted. Reported estimates put the fall from about $10.25 billion in 2023 to roughly $4 billion in 2024—while Egypt was already dealing with debt, inflation, and dependence on outside financing.
Egypt has therefore relied mainly on failing diplomatic pressure, coordination with international naval forces, and maintaining security around the canal itself. That approach is inadequate from a revenue-protection perspective, but Cairo appears to judge that independently attacking the Houthis would carry greater military and political risks than the approximately $6.5 Billion in lost canal income is worth.
The practical defense of the southern approach has consequently been left largely to multinational naval operations rather than Egypt alone.
Civil war torn Yemen, the country from which the terrorist attacks originate, has become a tribal no-man's land pocked with canyons and rills inhabited by the Iran/IRGC backed proxy Houthi Terrorists. Yemen is one of the world's least developed countries. A police action performed by the UN/Internationally recognized Yemeni government has become untenable.
The last known U.S. attack on Houthi targets in Yemen was May 6, 2025, when the United States ended its six-week bombing campaign, Operation Rough Rider, under a ceasefire mediated by Oman. The campaign had begun on March 15, 2025.
More here:
https://en.amwalalghad.com/suez-canal-revenues-drop-45-5-in-fy-2024-2025-cbe/