Descartes, in his proposal of substance dualism, did **not** distinguish between an "emergent mind" versus a "mind outside the brain" in the way we might understand those concepts today. Here's why:
* **Substance Dualism:** Descartes argued that the mind (or soul) and the body (including the brain) are two fundamentally different *substances*. The mind is a thinking, non-extended substance (res cogitans), and the body is an extended, non-thinking substance (res extensa).
* **No Emergence:** The idea of "emergence" as it's commonly used now (where complex mental properties arise from the interaction of simpler physical components) wasn't part of Descartes' framework. He posited that the mind was a distinct substance from the outset, not something that "emerged" from physical processes. It was created, and capable of reasoning, thinking etc.
* **Mind is Always "Outside" the Brain (in a sense):** In Cartesian dualism, the mind isn't *in* the brain. It interacts *with* the brain (specifically, Descartes suggested the pineal gland was the point of interaction), but it's fundamentally separate. So, the mind, for Descartes, is always "outside" the brain in the sense that it's a different kind of thing, not composed of the same material or governed by the same laws.
**In Summary:** Descartes' dualism proposed a fundamental separation between mind and body. The idea of a mind "emerging" from physical processes or of the mind being *inside* the brain in the way we understand the physical containment today is incompatible with his view. The mind, as a non-physical substance, was always considered separate and distinct.
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