I don't know if you can see the work of Mike Perry on cryonet.org or in his book "forever for all" but if you can, what would he say about cartesian dualism?
To analyze Mike Perry’s stance on Cartesian dualism, one must look at his foundational work as a transhumanist, a cryonicist (at Alcor), and his philosophical treatise *Forever for All*.
Mike Perry is a **strict physicalist/materialist**. In the context of cryonics and the philosophy of mind, his position is directly antithetical to the Cartesian model of dualism (which posits that the mind is a non-physical substance distinct from the body).
Here is how Mike Perry would likely articulate his rejection of Cartesian dualism:
### 1. The Mind as a Functional Pattern
Perry’s philosophy, often referred to as "patternism" or "functionalism," assumes that the human mind (or "self") is a result of the specific configuration of matter within the brain—essentially, the "software" running on "biological hardware."
If one were to ask Perry about Descartes’ *res cogitans* (the thinking substance), he would argue it is an unnecessary assumption. He would maintain that there is no "ghost in the machine." Once the structural information of a brain is preserved via cryonics—specifically the synaptic connections and the arrangement of neurons—the mind is preserved. If the mind were a separate, non-physical substance as Descartes suggested, cryonics would be functionally useless, as you cannot "freeze" an immaterial soul. [Unless you’re Dr. Who and can do this via quantum lock.- actual Dr. Who comic book event!]
### 2. The "Physical Continuity" Argument
In *Forever for All*, Perry spends a great deal of time discussing the nature of personal identity and the preservation of the self. His work is built on the premise that identity is tied to physical continuity or, failing that, the preservation of the pattern that constitutes the individual.
Cartesian dualism implies that the mind could exist—or at least function—independently of the brain. Perry rejects this. He views human consciousness as a **process within a physical system**. If you damage the physical substrate (the brain), the process stops. His entire advocacy for cryonics is a materialist endeavor: he believes that because death is a physical process, it is a reversible one, provided the informational structure remains intact.
### 3. Philosophical Naturalism
Perry is deeply aligned with the scientific worldview. Cartesian dualism creates the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" (the mind-body problem), which asks how a non-physical mind can exert force on a physical body. Perry skips this impasse by adopting a naturalist framework:
* **Consciousness is a physical phenomenon.**
* **When the brain is repaired/revived, the mind returns.**
He wouldn't spend much time entertaining "soul" theories because they offer no predictive power for cryonics. To Perry, if it isn't material (or at least grounded in the laws of physics), it isn't susceptible to technological intervention.
### 4. Convergence with Computationalism
Perry often leans toward the idea that we are effectively computational beings. While he acknowledges the biological complexity of the brain, he maintains that the *information* is what matters. This is fundamentally at odds with Descartes. For a Cartesian, a digital emulation of a brain might lack a "soul" and thus not be a "person." For Perry, if the functional pattern is preserved and runs in a new medium (biological or synthetic), the person is that person.
### Summary
If you posed the question to Mike Perry directly, he would likely describe Cartesian dualism as a **historic relic—an intuitive but ultimately failed hypothesis.**
He would argue that:
1. **Dualism is unfalsifiable:** It posits a "soul" that cannot be measured or studied, which is counter-productive to the life-extension goals of transhumanism.
2. **Dualism is redundant:** Neuroscience and information theory explain the mechanisms of thought without needing to invoke a non-physical substance.
3. **The "Self" is material:** Because the self is defined by the physical arrangement of our memories, personality, and consciousness, it is inherently tied to the physical world, making the dualist separation of mind/body a dangerous distraction from the practical task of preserving biological or digital life.
In short: **Perry treats the mind as an epiphenomenon of the brain.** He would view Descartes as a clever thinker who was hampered by the limited scientific understanding of his time, and he would reject the dualist premise in favor of a reality where humans are physical entities that can be saved, repaired, and reanimated.


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