The SST programme in America was federally funded, much like Concorde. If memory serves the UK fleet was public funded with each aircraft sold to BA for a pound apiece.
Similar was going on in the US, government funded competition between Lockheed and Boeing. The Boeing version was the winner in competition (Boeing not being the monopoly on commercial aviation then as it is now in America, but competing with Lockheed and Douglas).
The usual cost over-runs in government aircraft development and procurement pissed off the bean counters mightily, and certainly contributed to the result, but the real killer was airline apathy to the notion of accepting these things and putting them into service. They didn't see a market they could serve and make a profit, so even if the government hadn't pulled the plug (Nixon, I believe), no operators were enthusiastic about taking them.
It wasn't Boeing's cock-up to cover up. No operator seeing a potential market to serve after national pride had been assuaged by building them on the taxpayer's dime.
Meanwhile, the general press was writing scare-pieces about sonic booms across the land, but it was typical un-informed reporters twaddle and fear mongering. Back to the controlled airspace issue, you simply can't put a supersonic passenger carrier in proximity to a subsonic traffic lane.
As far as usability, they might have been useful for coast-to-coast rich-n-famous traffic, but anything shorter domestically was of no real benefit. Funny how military supersonic flight across the country doesn't upset civilians at their breakfast, including the SR-71 speed run between coasts when the one destined for the Smithsonian was delivered.
Anyway, the usual cost over-run on government aircraft project management was often blamed for killing SST, but the big killer was the fact no domestic operator wanted to be saddled with the dam thing after it was built and offered up to them, even with government subsidy.
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